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Sea-Level Rise and the Endangered Species Act 
Dave Owen∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Through no fault of their own, piping plovers have chosen their 
habitats poorly. Many piping plovers nest on ocean beaches, and 
all piping plovers spend their winters foraging and sheltering on 
dry beaches and in the adjacent intertidal zone.1 Consequently, 
piping plovers are heavily dependent—for some populations, 
entirely dependent—on habitats very close to sea level.2 Because 
of widespread coastal development, these habitats have long been 
under threat, and the threat has recently taken on an added 
dimension. Rising sea levels, caused in part by greenhouse gas 
emissions and associated climate change, are beginning to inundate 
the piping plover’s present habitats.3 As its habitats disappear, the 
piping plover may disappear as well.4 
The piping plover is not alone in its plight.5 The Fish and 
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(“FWS” and “NOAA Fisheries;” collectively “the Services”), the 
two federal agencies with primary responsibility for protecting 
threatened and endangered species, have not compiled any sort of 
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 1. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., PIPING PLOVER (CHARADRIUS 
MELODUS) 5-YEAR REVIEW: SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 17, 23–30 (2009), 
http://www.fws.gov/northeast/endangered/PDF/Piping_Plover_five_year_revie
w_and_summary.pdf (describing the piping plover’s range and habitat needs). 
Populations breeding in the upper Midwest rely on beaches and dunes adjacent 
to freshwater, but spend their winters along the Gulf Coast. See id. at 13. The 
intertidal zone is the area between the high- and low-tide lines. 
 2. See id. at 29–30. 
 3. Id. at 50–52. 
 4. See id. at 52 (“Sea-level rise poses a significant threat to all piping 
plover populations during the migration and wintering portion of their life 
cycle.”). 
 5. See Reed F. Noss, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Florida’s 
Unenviable Position with Respect to Sea Level Rise, 107 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 3 
(2011) (“[T]he impacts of sea level rise constitute one of the greatest potential 
causes of global species extinctions and ecosystem disruption over coming 
decades and centuries.”). 
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comprehensive list of species imperiled by sea-level rise.6 But if 
they did, the list would likely be quite long. Hawaiian monk seals,7 
many species of sea turtles,8 Louisiana black bears,9 black 
abalones,10 Atlantic sturgeon,11 and any species unique to the 
Florida Keys12 would headline an extensive list of species whose 
habitats may soon be inundated, infiltrated with saltwater, or 
compressed between an encroaching ocean and the hard edges of 
human development.13 Most, if not all, of those species were 
already under threat, whether because of habitat alteration, 
invasive species, pollution, or some combination of factors.14 For 
some, the addition of rising seas may represent a tipping point 
toward extinction. 
This Essay addresses how environmental law is, or is not, 
responding to that threat. I focus on the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”), which serves as the last line of defense for many species 
imperiled with extinction. At present, that defense is not 
                                                                                                             
 6. With some exceptions, FWS generally holds jurisdiction over terrestrial 
and freshwater species, and NMFS generally holds jurisdiction over marine and 
diadromous species. 
 7. Jason D. Baker et al., Potential Effects of Sea Level Rise on the 
Terrestrial Habitats of Endangered and Endemic Megafauna in the 
Northwestern Hawaiian Islands, 2 ENDANGERED SPECIES RES. 21 (2006) 
(describing threats to Hawaiian monk seals and several other species). 
 8. Lucy A. Hawkes et al., Climate Change and Marine Turtles, 7 
ENDANGERED SPECIES RES. 137, 138–39 (2009). 
 9. See Richard F. Keim et al., Ecological Consequences of Changing 
Hydrological Conditions in Wetland Forests of Coastal Louisiana, in COASTAL 
ENVIRONMENT AND WATER QUALITY 383–96 (Y.J. Xu & V.P. Singh eds., 2006) 
(identifying sea-level rise as a threat to Louisiana’s coastal forests and black 
bears as dependent upon those forests). 
 10. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered Status for 
Black Abalone, 74 Fed. Reg. 1937, 1939 (Jan. 14, 2009) (identifying sea-level 
rise as a “medium threat” to the species). 
 11. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Listing 
Determinations for Two Distinct Population Segments of Atlantic Sturgeon 
(Acipenser oxyrinchus oxyrinchus) in the Southeast, 77 Fed. Reg. 5914, 5972 
(Feb. 6, 2012). 
 12. See Joyce Maschinski et al., Sinking Ships: Conservation Options for 
Endemic Taxa Threatened by Sea Level Rise, 107 CLIMATIC CHANGE 147, 148–
50 (2011) (discussing threats to Florida Keys species). 
 13. Because sea-level rise is a global problem, a full list would include 
hundreds of species from other countries as well. See, e.g., Christina J. 
Greenwood & Ishtiaq Uddin Ahmad, The Tigers of Bangladesh, U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/endangered/news/bulletin-spring2010/the-
tigers-of-bangladesh.html (2010) (noting that sea-level rise threatens the 
survival of the world’s largest remaining population of wild tigers). 
 14. In the course of researching for this Essay, I have not found any 
documentation of a species imperiled exclusively by sea-level rise. Instead, sea-
level rise is always one of several threats. 
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particularly strong, for sea-level rise presents the Services with a 
very difficult dilemma. An aggressive regulatory response might 
help protect species, but the practical and political barriers to 
aggressive regulation are daunting.15 Consequently, the Services, 
though quite willing to acknowledge the gravity of the threat, have 
studiously eschewed any attempt to invoke their regulatory powers 
to respond to sea-level rise.16 Instead, they have used information 
and persuasion as their primary means of changing the ways that 
public and private entities manage the coastal zone.17 That softer 
approach comports with a widely-shared sense that the future of 
environmental law lies in collaborative, adaptive, and cooperative 
alternatives to traditional regulation.18 And, of course, it 
acknowledges the political controversies surrounding biodiversity 
protection and, more generally, regulatory governance. But even if 
the Services’ approach is understandable, its odds of success are 
rather slim.19 
No innovation in governance will make this dilemma 
disappear.20 Consequently, while this Essay closes by suggesting 
several modest reforms, its broader point will strike most readers 
as a familiar lament. Notwithstanding the deregulatory fashions of 
our present era, and the understandable desire of environmental 
thinkers to find some less legalistic way to achieve positive 
environmental change, a serious response to sea-level rise will 
necessitate a genuine commitment to environmental regulation. 
There is really no other choice. 
In Part II, this Essay begins by describing the causes and 
environmental consequences of sea-level rise. Part III then 
explores the potential application of the ESA to sea-level rise, first 
surveying the regulatory and non-regulatory tools set forth in the 
statute, and then considering how they might be implemented. Part 
IV turns from potential application to actual practices, describing 
                                                                                                             
 15. See infra Part V. 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. See infra notes 94–102 and accompanying text. 
 18. See, e.g., Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., The Breaking the Logjam 
Project, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2008) (criticizing traditional environmental 
law as obsolescent); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE 
L.J. 607, 627 (blaming “rigid, highly bureaucratized ‘command-and-control’ 
regulation” for “regulatory failure”). 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. For articles offering creative solutions to the biodiversity threats posed 
by climate change, see Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining 
Nature and Natural Resources Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 
171 (2010); Maschinski et al., supra note 12 (evaluating relocation of species as 
an option). But as both articles acknowledge, the obstacles to successful species 
relocations are likely to be substantial. 
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what the Services have actually done to address sea-level rise. Part 
V explores why there are significant differences between 
theoretical possibilities and actual practices, and this Essay 
concludes with suggestions for partial reform.  
II. RISING SEAS AND CHANGING HABITATS 
Sea levels are rising.21 The changes are incremental and 
uneven; in some areas, land elevations are also rising, which slows 
or negates the apparent change, and in others, land is subsiding, 
thereby accelerating the impacts of rising seas.22 But across the 
globe, average sea levels rose by approximately 1.7 millimeters per 
year over the past century.23 Predictions of future sea-level rise 
vary significantly and have substantial error ranges, though some 
level of accelerated change is all but certain.24 Several recent 
studies project as much as four feet of sea-level rise by the end of 
the twenty-first century and continued change thereafter.25 If 
substantial portions of the Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets melt, 
the changes could be much more drastic.26 
                                                                                                             
 21. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 387 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007). See 
also Stefan Rahmstorf et al., Recent Climate Observations Compared to 
Projections, 316 SCI. 709, 709 (2007) (“Since 1990 the observed sea level has 
been rising faster than the rise projected by models . . . .”). 
 22. See Coastal Areas Impacts & Adaptation, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-adaptation/ coasts.html#impactssea 
(last updated June 14, 2012). 
 23. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATIONS AND VULNERABILITY 320 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 
2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-
chapter6.pdf. 
 24. See, e.g., Martin Vermeer & Stefan Rahmstorf, Global Sea Level Linked 
to Global Temperature, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 21527, 21531 (2009) 
(predicting changes three times higher than most recent projections of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 
 25. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Listing of the Miami 
Blue Butterfly as Endangered Throughout Its Range; Listing of the Cassius 
Blue, Ceraunus Blue, and Nickerbean Blue Butterflies as Threatened Due to 
Similarity of Appearance to the Miami Blue Butterfly in Coastal South and 
Central Florida, 77 Fed. Reg. 20948, 20970 (Apr. 6, 2012) (summarizing recent 
studies). 
 26. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 23, at 
317 (“Irreversible breakdown of the West Antarctica and/or Greenland ice 
sheets, if triggered by rising temperatures, would make this long-term rise 
significantly larger, ultimately questioning the viability of many coastal 
settlements across the globe.”).  
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The primary cause of these changes has long been clear.27 Sea 
levels are rising because average global temperatures are rising, 
and those rising temperatures cause liquid water to expand and ice 
to melt.28 Global temperatures are rising largely because of human 
emissions of greenhouse gases, which increase the capacity of the 
atmosphere to retain energy radiated upward as heat.29 Those 
greenhouse gas emissions derive from a wide variety of sources 
and activities, with fossil fuel combustion contributing the lion’s 
share.30 That fossil fuel combustion, in turn, supports electric 
power generation, transportation, manufacturing, and domestic 
heating across much of the world.31 
Those rising seas threaten biodiversity in several ways. Many 
coastal areas have gradual topography, and a slight rise in sea 
levels can inundate many acres of land.32 Areas that were 
previously subject to the ebb and flow of the tides will become 
open water; dry sand beaches and coastal wetlands will be flooded; 
inland freshwater wetlands, forests, or dune habitats will be 
displaced by more salt-tolerant assemblages; and freshwater 
streams and aquifers may turn brackish or saline.33 These habitat 
shifts will be stressful for species even in undeveloped areas, but 
where humans have built up the coastal zone, habitat zones cannot 
migrate landward as sea levels rise. As a result, some habitats will 
be lost.34 The problem is even more acute for areas with hardly any 
topographic variation, like southern Florida or southern Louisiana. 
There, habitat migrations would have to be exceedingly rapid to 
                                                                                                             
 27. See, e.g., James G. Titus, Sea Level Rise, in THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES: REPORT TO CONGRESS 118, 118–19 
(1989) (describing the “greenhouse effect” as a cause of sea-level rise). 
 28. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 21, 
at 408. 
 29. See id. at 133–36. 
 30. See id. at 136 (quantifying contributions from various sources). 
 31. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, 1990–2010 (2012), available at 
http://epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-
Main-Text.pdf. 
 32. See, e.g., James G. Titus & Charlie Richman, Maps of Lands Vulnerable 
to Sea Level Rise: Modeled Elevations along the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, 
18 CLIMATE RES. 205, 217-23 (2001) (mapping vulnerable areas in Louisiana, 
Florida, North Carolina, and the mid-Atlantic coast). 
 33. See Ann Shellenbarger Jones et al., Vulnerable Species: The Effects of 
Sea-Level Rise on Costal Habitats, in U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE 
PROGRAM, COASTAL SENSITIVITY TO SEA-LEVEL RISE: A FOCUS ON THE MID-
ATLANTIC REGION 73–83 (2009) (describing habitat impacts). 
 34. See Noss, supra note 5, at 3 (“[H]uman development adjacent to the 
coasts has destroyed suitable habitat and severed potential dispersal corridors to 
inland areas that might otherwise accommodate range shifts.”). 
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keep pace with rising seas.35 In some areas—the Florida 
Everglades and Keys provide perhaps the starkest examples—there 
may soon be nowhere that the habitat can go.36 And as habitat 
goes, so, often, go the species.37 
III. LEGAL OPTIONS 
To all of this we have, in theory, a legislative response. 
According to conventional wisdom, the ESA is one of the most 
powerful environmental laws in the world.38 It combines 
mandatory procedures with seemingly stringent regulatory 
prohibitions, creating a formidable set of coercive sticks, and it 
also empowers the Services to use a variety of incentive- and 
information-based strategies. This Part addresses how all of these 
tools might help the Services respond to sea-level rise. 
A. Section 4 
The ESA’s regulatory and nonregulatory protections begin 
with section 4, which sets forth procedures for listing species as 
threatened or endangered, designating critical habitat for those 
species, and drafting recovery plans.39 Section 4 itself does not 
provide any regulatory protection for species. Other than 
authorizing recovery plans, which typically are not binding, it 
simply provides procedures for making species eligible for 
protection. But outside of a few narrow exceptions, a listing under 
                                                                                                             
 35. See id.; John C. Ogden et al., The Use of Conceptual Ecological Models 
to Guide Ecosystem Restoration in South Florida, 25 WETLANDS 795, 801 
(2005) (“Given that Florida is characterized by very small topographic relief, a 
conservatively estimated sea-level rise of 0.75 m over the next century will 
reduce shoreline habitat, overall habitat extent, and mix sediments and salinities 
altering water composition.” (citation omitted)). 
 36. See generally THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, INITIAL ESTIMATES OF THE 
ECOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON THE 
FLORIDA KEYS THROUGH THE YEAR 2100 (2009) (mapping future scenarios for 
the Florida Keys, some of which involve nearly complete inundation). 
 37. See David S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in 
the United States, 48 BIOSCIENCE 607, 609 (1998) (identifying habitat loss as 
the largest threat to threatened and endangered species). 
 38. See, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., Indian Tribes, in 1 THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: RENEWING THE CONSERVATION 
PROMISE 161, 170 (Dale D. Goble et al. eds., 2006) (describing the ESA as “the 
strongest environmental law in the world”). 
 39. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006). 
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section 4 is a condition precedent to any other protection under the 
Act.40  
One might expect sea-level rise to affect section 4 
implementation in several ways. First, the Services might consider 
sea-level rise when making their listing decisions.41 Section 4 lists 
several factors that the Services must take into account, including 
“the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment 
of [the species’] habitat or range.”42 That factor clearly 
encompasses the effects of sea-level rise.43 Second, the Services 
might adjust or expand their critical habitat designations to 
encompass inland areas likely to become essential as sea levels 
rise.44 The ESA defines critical habitat as habitat “essential to the 
conservation of the species,” and if existing habitat will be 
inundated, then the habitat that remains, or even habitat areas that 
are not presently suitable for the species, may become essential.45 
Finally, recovery plans could include a wide variety of provisions 
designed to allow species to adjust to rising seas.46 
B. Section 7 
While section 4 establishes species’ eligibility for protection, 
the actual protection comes from elsewhere in the statute, with 
section 7 playing a central role.47 Section 7 prohibits federal 
                                                                                                             
 40. Unlisted species may be the beneficiaries, incidentally and sometimes 
intentionally, of the protection of species listed under the Act, but sections 7 and 
9 extend their direct protections only to species actually listed. 
 41. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: 
Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 33 (2008) 
(arguing that “[s]ection 4 leaves no room for debate over whether the agency 
must integrate climate change effects in the listing decision”). 
 42. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A). 
 43. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text. 
 44. See Ruhl, supra note 41, at 36 (“[T]he provision allowing designation of 
specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species if ‘essential 
for the conservation of the species’ may be an ideal way for FWS to respond 
aggressively to ecological reshuffling.”). 
 45. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (2006). Not all essential areas are to be 
included; the definition includes only those essential areas “which may require 
special management considerations or protection.” Id. The definition also 
expressly includes presently unoccupied habitat if it meets the “essential” 
criterion. See id. § 1532(5)(A)(ii). 
 46. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f); Anna T. Moritz et al., Biodiversity Baking and 
Boiling: Endangered Species Act Turning Down the Heat, 44 TULSA L. REV. 
205, 222 (2008) (“[T]he section 7 consultation process is the heart of the 
ESA.”). 
 47. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006). Many commentators view section 7 as the 
most influential portion of the ESA. However, in practice, implementation of 
sections 7 and 9 is closely intertwined, and the influence of the two sections can 
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agencies from taking actions likely to “jeopardize” the continued 
existence of listed species or to “result in the destruction or adverse 
modification” of designated critical habitat.48 Section 7 also creates 
detailed procedural requirements for putting that substantive 
mandate into effect. If their activities may affect listed species, 
federal agencies are obligated to “consult” with one of the 
Services, depending on which agency holds jurisdiction over the 
affected species. The Services must provide either a concurrence 
that the proposed project’s effects will not be adverse or, if some 
adverse effect is possible, a “biological opinion” assessing whether 
the project is likely to cause jeopardy or adverse modification and 
prescribing adjustments to reduce or eliminate the adverse 
impacts.49 This consultation process rarely halts projects, but every 
year it leads to thousands of environmentally protective project 
changes.50  
As with section 4, the Services might use section 7 to respond 
to sea-level rise in several ways. First, and perhaps most 
ambitiously, the Services might use the section 7 process to 
address the root causes of climate change.51 Thus, when federal 
agencies consider actions that will accelerate greenhouse gas 
emissions or eliminate greenhouse gas sinks,52 the Services might 
require consultation. Through those consultation processes, the 
Services might negotiate or impose conditions designed to avoid or 
mitigate emissions.53  
Even if the Services do not take that step, they might invoke 
sea-level rise as a reason to ratchet up their efforts to address other 
                                                                                                             
 
be difficult to separate. See Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of 
Regulating Small Harms, 64 FLA. L. REV. 141, 187 & n.292 (2012) (explaining 
how section 7 consultations almost invariably lead to restrictions designed to 
avoid “takes” of listed species). 
 48. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Section 7(a)(1), which requires all federal 
agencies to take steps to conserve listed species, has proven less influential in 
practice, and I do not discuss its importance here. 
 49. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b), (c) (setting forth the consultation requirements). 
 50. See Owen, supra note 47, at 163–64. 
 51. See Moritz et al., supra note 46, at 207 (“The regulation of greenhouse 
gas emissions under the ESA through the Section 7 consultation process is 
legally required and of great practical importance.”). But see Ruhl, supra note 
41, at 46–47 (arguing that the consultation process applies poorly to greenhouse 
gas sources). 
 52. A greenhouse gas sink is a landscape feature, like a growing forest, that 
removes greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. 
 53. See Moritz et al., supra note 46, at 223–29. 
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threats.54 For example, if a species is likely to be threatened by 
saltwater intrusion, the Services might seek more stringent controls 
on upstream water withdrawals and pollutant discharges.55 The 
gravity of those other threats may increase as sea-level rise adds a 
new stressor, creating a likelihood of jeopardy or adverse 
modification even if the same activities would pose less of a threat 
in a world without climate change.56 Consequently, the Services 
might reach more jeopardy or adverse modification findings, or 
they might use the section 7 process to impose more protective 
conditions in an effort to increase species’ capacity to survive 
despite rising seas. 
C. Section 9 (and Sections 7 and 10) 
The ESA’s other major substantive constraint comes from 
section 9, which prohibits anyone from “taking” endangered 
species.57 That prohibition appears far-reaching, particularly 
because the Services interpret the prohibition to include some 
modifications to habitat.58 Nevertheless, exceptions to the 
prohibition do exist. “Incidental” takes are allowed pursuant to 
approved “incidental take statements,” which the Services issue 
through the section 7 consultation process, and pursuant to “habitat 
conservation plans,” which are governed by ESA section 10.59 
                                                                                                             
 54. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live 
Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 43–45 (2010) (emphasizing the reduction of nonclimate 
stressors as a central priority for environmental protection in an era of climate 
change). 
 55. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Listing 
Determinations for Two Distinct Population Segments of Atlantic Sturgeon 
(Acipenser oxyrinchus oxyrinchus) in the Southeast, 77 Fed. Reg. 5914, 5972 
(Feb. 6, 2012) (discussing the relationship between saltwater intrusion and other 
habitat stressors).  
 56. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 
367–69 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (rejecting as illegal a biological opinion that failed to 
consider whether climate change would exacerbate other strains upon the 
species); Moritz et al., supra note 46, at 223 (“[A] finding that allowing the 
destruction of certain coastal wetlands relied upon by a listed species will not 
equate to jeopardy because sufficient other wetlands still exist in a nearby 
preserve utterly fails to protect the species if the preserve will no longer exist in 
50 years following another half-meter or more of sea level rise.”). 
 57. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006). 
 58. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 
687 (1995) (upholding this interpretation). 
 59. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2006); id. § 1539(a); J.B. Ruhl, How to Kill 
Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species Act 
“HCP” Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 345 (1999). 
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Both incidental take statements and habitat conservation plans 
require compliance with conditions designed to minimize the 
impact of the take, and habitat conservation plans can also include 
measures to compensate for takes.60 
Like the jeopardy and adverse modification prohibitions, the 
take prohibition might address sea-level rise in two primary ways. 
First, a few commentators and activists have argued that at least 
some actions that emit greenhouse gases, and thus contribute to 
habitat modifications, are causing prohibited takes and should 
therefore face liability under section 9.61 Second, sea-level rise 
might provide a basis for finding that other incursions upon habitat 
or threats to species constitute a “take.” For example, amid stable 
sea levels, a beach-armoring program that degrades some habitat 
might not create a take because animals may be able to avoid the 
project area without incurring any harm. But if sea-level rise has 
left those animals with nowhere else to go, the same activity might 
be subject to section 9 liability. 
D. Non-Regulatory Tools 
When lawyers and politicians talk about the ESA, they tend to 
characterize it as a regulatory “pit bull,” a source of rigid and 
unyielding prohibitions.62 But actual implementation of section 7 
and section 9 involves far fewer commands (let alone enforcement 
actions) and much more negotiation than the “pit bull” 
characterization would suggest.63 The Services also have a variety 
of nonregulatory tools, many of which they could employ to 
address sea-level rise. They can draft recovery plans, which can 
provide blueprints for species conservation.64 They can use federal 
                                                                                                             
 60. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(ii); id. § 1539(a) (requiring applicants to 
“minimize and mitigate” impacts). 
 61. See, e.g., Moritz et al., supra note 46, at 230–31. But see Ruhl, supra 
note 41, at 40–42 (concluding that plaintiffs could not show that a specific 
emissions source was the proximate cause of a take); Owen, supra note 47, at 
160 (drawing a similar conclusion). 
 62. See, e.g., Steven P. Quarles, The Pit Bull Goes to School: The 
Endangered Species Act at 25: What Works?, 15 ENVTL. F. 55, 55 (1998). 
 63. See Owen, supra note 47, at 182–85. 
 64. See Anthony Povilitis & Kierán Suckling, Addressing Climate Change 
Threats to Endangered Species in U.S. Recovery Plans, 24 CONSERVATION 
BIOLOGY 372, 372 (2010) (“Recovery plans are the central organizing tool for 
guiding species restoration under the U.S. Endangered Species Act.”). Legal 
authors have generally been less sanguine in their estimation of the value of 
recovery plans, at least as they have traditionally been drafted. See, e.g., 
Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the 
2012] SEA-LEVEL RISE AND THE ESA 129 
 
 
 
money to purchase habitat.65 They can manage areas that they 
already control, like wildlife refuges, to promote resilience in the 
face of rising seas, perhaps by restoring or creating habitat to 
compensate for likely losses elsewhere.66 They can promote 
scientific research on the threats posed by sea-level rise and the 
ways that species might respond. Using that knowledge, they can 
participate, as informational resources and as advocates rather than 
as regulators, in state, local, and private decision-making 
processes.67 And finally, they can try to educate the general public 
about the impacts of sea-level rise.68 None of these options figures 
centrally in the average legal casebook’s coverage of the ESA, but 
all are prominent in the Services’ portfolio of tools. 
IV. ACTUAL RESPONSES 
So, what are the Services actually doing? The answer is not 
easy to discern. While the Services produce thousands of 
documents every year, most are not published to the Internet.69 Nor 
do the Services produce summary statistics explaining how, if at 
all, their implementation approaches are evolving or changing. 
ESA implementation can therefore seem like a black box, and 
exposing that box’s inner workings would require issuing dozens 
of Freedom of Information Act requests, reviewing hundreds—
                                                                                                             
 
Endangered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 16 & n.64 (1996) (arguing that 
recovery plans were often vague and usually unenforceable). 
 65. See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FY 2011 COOPERATIVE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSERVATION FUND PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS 
ARRANGED BY STATE (2012), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/ 
grants/Sect%206%20FY2011%20Combined%20Award%20Summaries%20Fina
l%208-22.pdf. 
 66. See, e.g., Working with Nature to Prepare for the Change, U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/southeast/climate/stories/alligatorriver.html 
(last updated Sept. 28, 2010) (describing efforts to promote habitat resiliency at 
the Alligator River National Wildlife Refuge in North Carolina) [hereinafter 
Working with Nature]. 
 67. For example, in a recent research project focused on state water 
allocation decisions, I discovered that the Services often submitted comments on 
water right applications. See Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, The Public 
Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 1118 
(2012). 
 68. See, e.g., There’s Nothing Level About Sea Level, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE 
SERV., http://www.fws.gov/southeast/climate/profiles/caperomain.html (last 
updated Mar. 2, 2011) (educational video) [hereinafter There’s Nothing Level]. 
 69. Listing decisions and critical habitat-designation documents are 
published in the Federal Register. Biological opinions and habitat conservation 
plans are not, however, and many are not published anywhere on the Internet. 
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perhaps thousands—of documents, and interviewing many agency 
staff.70 For this Essay, I did not take those ambitious steps. My 
research instead was limited to court cases, Federal Register 
filings, agency guidance documents and policy statements, and 
agency websites.  
Nevertheless, even that limited set of sources supports some 
intriguing, albeit tentative, conclusions about how the Services are 
using the ESA to respond to sea-level rise. The central conclusion 
is that the Services are committed to responding to sea-level rise, 
but only by using a subset of the available tools. Their marked 
preference has been to use their educational powers and persuasive 
authority rather than any sort of regulatory stick. 
A. Section 4 Implementation: Species Listing and Critical Habitat 
The most extensive paper trail documenting the Services’ 
responses to sea-level rise comes from implementation of ESA 
section 4.71 The Services’ proposed and final decisions to list 
species as threatened or endangered, to remove them from the lists, 
and to designate or change critical habitat all are published in the 
Federal Register, as are status reports on unresolved listing 
petitions. Consequently, an extensive written record documents 
what the Services are doing to implement section 4 and why. 
That record leaves no doubt that the Services now consider sea-
level rise to be a threat. For a few species, the Services have 
referred to sea-level rise as a primary reason for a threatened or 
endangered listing.72 For many others, they have identified it as a 
contributing threat, both in listing documents and in reviews of the 
status of species that remain candidates for listing.73 Whether the 
                                                                                                             
 70. For an example of this approach, see Owen, supra note 47, at 161–63. 
Even with this more exhaustive methodology, some questions about the efficacy 
of regulatory approaches remained very difficult, if not impossible, to answer. 
 71. That evidence is clear partly because listing documents are readily 
accessible.  
 72. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Listing of the 
Miami Blue Butterfly as Endangered Throughout Its Range; Listing of the 
Cassius Blue, Ceraunus Blue, and Nickerbean Blue Butterflies as Threatened 
Due to Similarity of Appearance to the Miami Blue Butterfly in Coastal South 
and Central Florida, 77 Fed. Reg. 20948, 20969–70 (Apr. 6, 2012) (“Climatic 
changes, including sea level rise, are major threats to south Florida, including 
the Miami blue and its habitat.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Listing 
Determinations for Two Distinct Population Segments of Atlantic Sturgeon 
(Acipenser oxyrinchus oxyrinchus) in the Southeast, 77 Fed. Reg. 5914, 5972 
(Feb. 6, 2012) (noting that sea-level rise will stress water supplies, leading to 
potential reductions in freshwater flows and thus impairing water quality); 
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Services are giving enough emphasis to sea-level rise is a scientific 
question beyond the scope of this Essay, but they are clearly 
treating it as a relevant factor. In that way, at least, sea-level rise 
has changed implementation of the ESA. 
Nevertheless, sea-level rise has not affected section 4 
implementation quite as much as one might expect. Initially, 
whatever effects are occurring are only of recent vintage. Through 
the end of 2011, the Services had actually discussed sea-level rise 
in 46 listing-related documents.74 All but one of those documents 
date from 2005 or later, and 27 of them—almost 60%—are from 
2010 and 2011 alone.75 Scientists have understood for decades that 
the climate is changing and that those changes would accelerate 
sea-level rise, but only in the last few years have the Services’ 
listing decisions begun to grapple with that reality.76 
Additionally, the evidence of changed approaches is almost 
entirely limited to species listings rather than critical habitat 
designations. One might expect the Services to designate as critical 
habitat areas that are presently not highly suitable, or perhaps not 
even occupied, to allow species and their habitats to migrate inland 
                                                                                                             
 
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Review of Native Species That 
Are Candidates for Listing as Endangered or Threatened; Annual Notice of 
Findings on Resubmitted Petitions; Annual Description of Progress on Listing 
Actions, 76 Fed. Reg. 66370, 66372, 66412, 66413, 66415, 66417 (Oct. 26, 
2011) (identifying sea-level rise as a threat to multiple plant species); 
Endangered and Threatened Species; Determination of Nine Distinct Population 
Segments of Loggerhead Sea Turtles as Endangered or Threatened, 76 Fed. Reg. 
58868, 58892, 58909, 58917 (Sept. 22, 2011) (discussing sea-level rise as a 
significant contributing threat). But see Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and 
Plants; 12-Month Finding on a Petition To List the Black-footed Albatross as 
Endangered or Threatened, 76 Fed. Reg. 62504, 62520–23 (Oct. 7, 2011) 
(identifying sea-level rise as a threat but not a substantial enough threat to justify 
listing). 
 74. I base these numbers on the results of an electronic search for FWS or 
NMFS Federal Register documents containing the phrase “sea-level rise.” From 
that overall pool, I eliminated documents that did not pertain to section 4 
implementation (for example, filings pertaining to management of national 
wildlife refuges). The resulting numbers do contain some imprecision; the 
difference between actually discussing sea-level rise and merely mentioning it—
for example, in a paper title, or in a boilerplate summary of climate change 
impacts—is obviously fuzzy, and another researcher might come to slightly 
different numbers. Nevertheless, the differences would be subtle. There are only 
a few additional documents that use the phrase “sea-level rise” without 
providing what I would describe as discussion. 
 75. A summary table is on file with the author and with the Louisiana Law 
Review and is available on request. 
 76. See Titus, supra note 27 (describing sea-level rise as a consequence of 
climate change; report chapter was written in 1989). 
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as sea levels change.77 That approach would fit with the letter and 
spirit of the law;78 in an era of shifting habitats, presently 
unoccupied areas may become essential if the species is to be 
conserved. Indeed, the Services themselves, along with many 
commentators, have endorsed that sort of anticipatory protection.79 
But to date, the Services have only once turned that rhetorical 
endorsement into reality. I found one critical habitat designation 
that encompassed areas likely to be needed as sea levels rise, as 
well as two earlier filings describing and inviting comments on that 
proposed approach.80 Two other documents emphasized the 
designation of presently-occupied habitat areas less vulnerable to 
sea-level rise, though in both cases that habitat might have been 
designated anyway (the documents are not clear on this point).81 In 
a larger—albeit still small—number of documents, the Services 
                                                                                                             
 77. See Ruhl, supra note 41, at 36 (explaining this potential approach). 
 78. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1) (2006) (“It is further declared to be the 
policy of Congress that all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to 
conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their 
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.”). 
 79. See NAT’L FISH, WILDLIFE & PLANTS CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY, 
PUBLIC REVIEW DRAFT 3 (2012), available at http://www.wildlifeadaptation 
strategy.gov/pdf/public_review_draft.pdf (noting that because “[m]any wildlife 
refuges and habitats could lose some of their original values . . . there’s a growing 
need to identify the best candidates for new conservation areas . . . .”); see also id. 
at 54–55 (emphasizing the importance of protecting an ample amount of habitat 
and of protecting habitat corridors). 
 80. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revised Designation of 
Critical Habitat for the Pacific Coast Population of the Western Snowy Plover, 77 
Fed. Reg. 36728, 36731, 36735 (June 19, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) 
(discussing this approach); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 
Designation of Critical Habitat and Taxonomic Revision for the Pacific Coast 
Population of the Western Snowy Plover, 77 Fed. Reg. 2243, 2243 (proposed Jan. 
17, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (“We are particularly interested in 
comments concerning . . . [s]pecific information on our proposed revised 
designation of back-dune systems and other habitats in an attempt to offset the 
anticipated effects of sea-level rise associated with climate change.”); Endangered 
and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revised Critical Habitat for the Pacific Coast 
Population of the Western Snowy Plover, 76 Fed. Reg. 16046, 16049–50 
(proposed Mar. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
 81. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Proposed 
Rulemaking to Revise Critical Habitat for Hawaiian Monk Seals, 76 Fed. Reg. 
32026, 32036, 32041–42 (proposed June 2, 2011) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 
226) (acknowledging sea-level rise as a threat, noting that the critical habitat 
designation includes areas less vulnerable to sea-level rise, and declining to 
designate unoccupied habitat); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 
Designation of Critical Habitat for the Louisiana Black Bear (Ursus americanus 
luteolus), 74 Fed. Reg. 10350, 10356–57 (Mar. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 17) (emphasizing that the designated area includes upland habitat that 
will remain viable as sea levels rise). 
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identified sea-level rise as a threat but declined to adjust the critical 
habitat boundary, usually citing uncertainty about where suitable 
habitat would eventually emerge.82 Consequently, for almost every 
species affected by sea-level rise, critical habitat designations are 
unchanged. 
B. Section 7 Implementation: Jeopardy and Adverse Modification 
The theme of reticent implementation continues with section 7. 
In theory, the Services might use section 7 to address the root 
causes of sea-level rise, or, alternatively or additionally, to increase 
species’ resilience in the face of sea-level rise by reducing other 
threats.83 In practice, however, they have emphatically disavowed 
the former course of action, and there is little, if any, evidence that 
they are pursuing the latter. 
Beginning in 2007, when the listing of the polar bear first 
compelled the Services to confront the issue, the Services clearly 
and repeatedly stated that they saw no role for section 7 in 
                                                                                                             
 82. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of 
Revised Critical Habitat for the Tidewater Goby, 76 Fed. Reg. 64996, 65001 
(proposed Oct. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (“[T]he information 
currently available on the effects of global climate change is not sufficiently 
precise to determine what additional areas, if any, may be appropriate to include 
in the revised critical habitat for this species to address the effects of climate 
change.”); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revised 
Designation of Critical Habitat for the Wintering Population of the Piping 
Plover (Charadrius melodus) in Texas, 74 Fed. Reg. 23476, 23480–81 (May 19, 
2009) (“However, the information currently available on the effects of climate 
change does not make sufficiently accurate estimates of the location and 
magnitude of the effects, so we are unable to determine what additional areas 
would be needed, nor where they would be located.”); Endangered and 
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for the 
Tidewater Goby (Eucyclogobius newberryi), 73 Fed. Reg. 5920, 5926 (Jan. 31, 
2008) (“We simply do not have good science at this point that provides local 
predictions. Therefore, we cannot account for such potential but unknown 
changes in local climate in our critical habitat designation.”); Endangered and 
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for Cirsium 
hydrophilum var. hydrophilum (Suisun thistle) and Cordylanthus mollis ssp. 
mollis (soft bird’s-beak), 72 Fed. Reg. 18518, 18519 (Apr. 12, 2007) 
(responding to a peer reviewer’s comment urging designation of presently 
unoccupied areas: “Given the speculative nature of such an undertaking, we do 
not consider the available evidence sufficient to support a finding that any 
particular unoccupied upland area is essential to the conservation of the 
subspecies.”). 
 83. See Moritz et al., supra note 46, at 222–30 (arguing that section 7 
should apply to greenhouse gas sources); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 367–70 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (rejecting a 
biological opinion that failed to account for climate change’s potential to 
exacerbate other stresses). 
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regulating the root causes of climate change.84 As one internal 
memorandum put it, “[W]here the effect at issue is climate change 
in the form of increased temperatures, a proposed action that 
involves the emission of [greenhouse gases] cannot pass the ‘may 
affect’ test and is not subject to consultation under the ESA and its 
implementing regulations.”85 At least in the Services’ view, that 
guidance still appears to be the law of the land. For another recent 
research project, I and my research assistant reviewed several 
thousand biological opinions, finding not a single consultation 
triggered by, or even addressing, a federal action’s greenhouse gas 
emissions.86 I am not aware of any evidence, either in the form of 
individual biological opinions or overarching agency guidance, of 
a subsequent change in practices. 
The evidence is more equivocal about whether the Services are 
attempting to use section 7 to support climate change adaptation.87 
If they are, the most likely changes would be adjustments in the 
type or extent of the protective measures the Services negotiate 
through the consultation process.88 Documenting whether such 
changes exist is difficult, even if one does have all the relevant 
biological opinions—and I do not. With only a cold, paper record, 
one cannot easily judge how protective the various protective 
measures are, let alone compare those conditions to the conditions 
imposed before sea-level rise emerged as a threat.89 Consequently, 
I cannot say with certainty whether the Services are using this 
approach. Nevertheless, if change has occurred, it has been fairly 
well-hidden. The Services have not published any sort of guidance 
directing their regional and field offices to adjust section 7 
                                                                                                             
 84. See Lawrence Liebesman et al., The Endangered Species Act and 
Climate Change, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11173, 11179 (2009) 
(quoting multiple FWS documents). 
 85. Memorandum from Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dept. of Interior, to 
Director, U.S. Dept. of Interior, 7 (Oct. 3, 2008) (citation omitted), available at 
http://www.peer.org/docs/doi/08_14_10_interior_solicitor_memo.pdf. 
 86. See Owen, supra note 47, at 169. 
 87. There is no question about whether the Services are using section 7 to 
respond to other threats to species. Clearly, they are. See id. at 171–72, 187–88. 
The question instead is whether sea-level rise, or, more generally, climate 
change, has generated any adjustments in ways the Services address those other 
threats. 
 88. As discussed above, section 7 consultations rarely block projects and 
usually instead lead to conditional approvals. See id. at 163–64 (summarizing 
past studies and providing recent statistics). 
 89. See id. at 171–72 (discussing the types of controls the Services 
sometimes impose and the challenge of assessing their efficacy). Of course, 
even if such a comparison did demonstrate that a change had occurred, the 
change might be due to some other variable rather than to concerns about sea-
level rise. 
2012] SEA-LEVEL RISE AND THE ESA 135 
 
 
 
implementation to promote climate change adaptation. And while 
their broader strategy documents argue that “[r]educing existing 
stresses on fish, wildlife, and plants can be some of the most 
effective, and doable, ways to increase resilience to climate 
change,” those documents say nothing about using the consultation 
process as a means to that end.90 In short, while I cannot say that 
the Services are not adjusting their approaches to section 7 in an 
effort to promote resilience in the face of sea level rise, I have 
found no evidence that they are doing so. 
C. Section 9 
The story of section 9 implementation is quite similar to that of 
section 7. Initially, the evidence of the Services’ activities is 
difficult to obtain. Most section 9 implementation occurs not 
through direct enforcement of the take provision—such 
enforcement rarely happens—but instead through incidental take 
statements and habitat conservation plans, neither of which are 
generally available online.91 Discerning changes in section 9 
implementation therefore would require reviewing many HCPs and 
biological opinions, neither of which I have gathered, as well as 
conducting more interviews. But even a more limited review 
suggests that section 9 is exerting limited influence. As with 
section 7, the Services have clearly disclaimed any intent to use 
section 9 to mitigate the causes of climate change.92 And they have 
not issued any regulations, amendments to their HCP handbook, or 
other guidance or memoranda directing agencies to otherwise 
                                                                                                             
 90. See NAT’L FISH, WILDLIFE & PLANTS CLIMATE ADAPTATION 
STRATEGY, supra note 79, at 4; id. at 57 (describing strategies for habitat 
conservation but not mentioning the adverse modification or jeopardy 
prohibitions or the consultation process). 
 91. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case 
Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 315 (1997) (noting that 
direct enforcement of section 9 is rare); Owen, supra note 47, at 187 (noting that 
section 9 plays an important role in consultation processes). 
 92. See News Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Salazar Retains 
Conservation Rule for Polar Bears Underlines Need for Comprehensive Energy 
and Climate Change Legislation (May 8, 2009), available at http://www.fws.gov/ 
news/NewsReleases/showNews.cfm?newsId=20FB90B6-A188-DB01-04788E08 
92D91701. The news release announced that the Obama Administration would 
retain a Bush Administration rule that precluded any section 9 liability for 
greenhouse gas emissions affecting polar bears. Interior Secretary Salazar was 
quoted as saying, “[T]he Endangered Species Act is not the proper mechanism for 
controlling our nation’s carbon emissions. Instead, we need a comprehensive 
energy and climate strategy that curbs climate change and its impacts—including 
the loss of sea ice.” Id. 
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change their approaches to section 9 implementation to account for 
sea-level rise.93 
D. Nonregulatory Tools 
While the Services have been reluctant to exercise their 
regulatory authority, they have not been inactive in responding to 
sea-level rise. The Services’ websites describe widespread efforts 
to educate the public about realities of sea-level rise and the 
biodiversity threats that it poses.94 In national wildlife refuges, 
where the Services already control land, they are planning for 
adaptation, working on habitat restoration projects designed to 
increase resilience in the face of sea-level rise, and, in some places, 
experimenting with carbon sequestration.95 They also are 
developing planning tools that state and local governments and 
private land managers could use to address sea-level rise. For 
example, FWS recently released its Sea Level Rise Affecting 
Marshes Model (“SLAMM”), a web-based tool that allows users to 
created simulated maps illustrating the effects of sea-level rise.96 
Ideally, the model should help local governments as they try to 
keep development away from areas that will likely flood, with the 
collateral benefit of protecting habitat in those same areas.97 
Finally, the Services continue to spend grant money on habitat 
preservation, and they direct some of that money to areas at risk 
from sea-level rise.98  
That selective emphasis on education, facilitation, and 
nonregulatory advocacy appears to reflect a deliberate strategy. In 
January 2012, the Services published a draft report outlining their 
                                                                                                             
 93. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., 
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT 
PROCESSING HANDBOOK (1996), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/ 
pdfs/laws/hcp_handbook.pdf. The handbook does not specifically discuss 
climate change mitigation or adaptation. 
 94. See, e.g., There’s Nothing Level, supra note 68. 
 95. See, e.g., id.; Working with Nature, supra note 66 (describing efforts to 
promote habitat resiliency at the Alligator River National Wildlife Refuge in 
North Carolina); Stacy Shelton, Opportunities to Sequester Carbon by Restoring 
North Carolina's Pocosins, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/ 
southeast/climate/stories/pocosinlakes.html (last updated Oct. 6, 2010) 
(describing a habitat restoration and carbon sequestration project). 
 96. Sea Level Rise Affecting Marshes Model, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
http://www.fws.gov/slamm/ (last updated Apr. 23, 2012). 
 97. For a discussion of how some state and local governments are actually 
reacting to sea-level rise, see infra notes 141–143 and accompanying text. 
 98. See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 65. 
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strategy for climate change adaptation.99 The report contains 
several case studies of the impacts of sea-level rise and leaves no 
doubt that the Services consider climate change generally, and sea-
level rise more specifically, as major challenges that they must 
address.100 To respond, the Services offer a menu of options. 
“[C]ollaborat[ing] among all levels of government,” “supporting 
adaptive management,” “increasing knowledge,” and “increasing 
awareness and motivating action” are a few representative 
examples.101 Some of the goals seem broad enough to encompass 
regulatory approaches, but the strategy provides no blueprint for 
turning any of these concepts into specific regulatory constraints. 
Instead, the Services assert that a central principle of climate 
adaptation will be to “foster communication and collaboration” 
rather than prescription.102 The vision seems to be of the Services 
as educators and (unpaid) consultants, providing information and 
analytical tools, facilitating partnerships, and spending a little bit 
of money, but leaving the thankless work of regulating, if any such 
work is to be done, to someone else.  
V. EXPLAINING THE RELUCTANCE 
The Services’ reluctance to invoke their regulatory powers to 
address sea-level rise, or climate change more generally, may 
initially surprise some readers. Why, we might ask, wouldn’t the 
agencies responsible for implementing our most important statute 
for protecting biodiversity use that statute to address what is 
emerging as an enormous threat to biodiversity?103 As Part III 
                                                                                                             
 99. See NAT’L FISH, WILDLIFE & PLANTS CLIMATE ADAPTATION 
STRATEGY, supra note 79. According to the website associated with the report, 
the FWS, NOAA, and the New York Division of Fish, Wildlife, and Marine 
Resources chaired the report-writing effort with input from many other entities. 
See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service & Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., 
About Us, NAT’L FISH, WILDLIFE & PLANTS CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY, 
http://www.wildlifeadaptationstrategy.gov/about.php (last visited Sept. 14, 
2012). As of this writing, the report remains in draft form. 
 100. See NAT’L FISH, WILDLIFE & PLANTS CLIMATE ADAPTATION 
STRATEGY, supra note 79, at 7 (identifying sea-level rise as an important effect 
of climate change), 44 (discussing impacts to piping plovers and agency 
responses), 57–58 (describing habitat impacts on New Jersey’s Cape May 
Peninsula), 62 (describing impacts to coastal Delaware), 67–68 (describing 
threats and response efforts at Elkhorn Slough in California). 
 101. Id. at 3, 5. 
 102. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. & Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., 
Goals, NAT’L FISH, WILDLIFE & PLANTS CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY, 
http://www.wildlifeadaptationstrategy.gov/goals.php (last visited June 6, 2012). 
 103. See Celine Bellard et al., Impacts of Climate Change on the Future of 
Biodiversity, 15 ECOLOGY LETTERS 365, 375 (2012) (reviewing the literature on 
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shows, the problem is not a lack of potential legal tools; if the 
Services were to pursue aggressive regulatory approaches, they 
could invoke multiple statutory provisions as authority.104 
Nevertheless, the Services have legal, practical, and political 
reasons for their reticence. And while those reasons are most 
salient with respect to climate change mitigation, the challenges of 
using the ESA as a tool for climate change adaptation are also 
substantial. To make matters even more difficult, the challenges of 
mitigation and adaptation—even voluntary, nonregulatory 
approaches to adaptation—are intertwined. 
A. Designating Critical Habitat 
The evidence of reticence begins with the Services’ reluctance 
to designate critical habitat that is not presently occupied, but that 
could become essential as sea levels rise. As Part IV discusses, 
external commentators have endorsed this practice, and the 
Services have acknowledged the importance of anticipatory habitat 
designations. However, they have done almost nothing to put this 
practice into effect.105  
There are several reasons for the Services’ reluctance. First, the 
Services are correct that predicting where suitable habitat will 
emerge involves uncertainty. Even if scientists can readily predict 
sea-level rise, the habitat dynamics triggered by that rise are 
substantially more complex.106 The second set of reasons is 
practical and political rather than scientific. Critical habitat 
                                                                                                             
 
climate change and biodiversity and concluding that most models “indicate 
alarming consequences for biodiversity with worst-case scenarios leading to 
extinction rates that would qualify as the sixth mass extinction in the history of 
the earth” (citation omitted)). The authors also note that modeled predictions of 
climate change’s impacts on biodiversity vary widely and that such modeling is 
relatively new, with many unresolved methodological problems. 
 104. See discussion supra Part III. 
 105. See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text. 
 106. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 23, 
at 320 (“Climate change and sea-level rise affect sediment transport [which in 
turn controls the configuration of many coastal habitats] in complex ways and 
abrupt, non-linear changes may occur as thresholds are crossed.” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted)); Donald R. Cahoon et al., Vulnerable Species: The 
Effects of Sea-Level Rise on Costal Habitats, in U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE 
PROGRAM, COASTAL SENSITIVITY TO SEA-LEVEL RISE: A FOCUS ON THE MID-
ATLANTIC REGION 9 (2009) (“Making long-term projections of coastal change is 
difficult because of the multiple, interacting factors that contribute to that 
change.”). 
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designations are already one of the Services’ greatest headaches.107 
Many designations are triggered by and then provoke litigation, 
and the Services have sometimes been rather skeptical of the 
protective value of those designations once they are completed.108 
Under such circumstances, a reluctance to expand the scope of 
designations is understandable.  
Nevertheless, if anticipatory critical habitat designations could 
protect species to even a limited extent—and prior research 
demonstrates, notwithstanding the Services’ occasional 
protestations to the contrary, that they could—this reluctance 
hamstrings the Services’ efforts to protect species.109 A critical 
habitat designation provides one of the few ways, other than 
simply purchasing property interests, that the Services could 
provide some preemptive regulatory protection for habitat that 
species might eventually need.110 That protection would not be 
absolute, for section 7 provides no direct protection against 
nonfederal alteration of critical habitat.111 But designations would 
at least warn landowners of potential future species needs, 
providing a signal that development of designated areas could 
create regulatory complexities and should therefore be avoided.112 
                                                                                                             
 107. See Owen, supra note 47, at 144–45. 
 108. See The Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005: 
Hearing on H.R. 3824 Before the H. Comm. on Res., 109th Cong. 28 (2005) 
(statement of Craig Manson, Assistant Sec’y of Dep’t of Interior). 
 109. See Owen, supra note 47, at 180–81 (describing ways critical habitat 
designations may influence landowners’ and land managers’ practices and 
concluding that the influence on regulators’ decision-making, while minor, is 
real); Kieran Suckling & Martin Taylor, Critical Habitat and Recovery, in 1 THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: RENEWING THE CONSERVATION 
PROMISE, supra note 38, at 75, 80–85 (providing case studies of critical habitat 
designations leading to species protection). 
 110. In theory, the loss of such habitat could also jeopardize species’ 
survival, but showing that the habitat will be adversely modified is often easier 
than supporting a jeopardy determination. See Owen, supra note 47, at 155–56. 
 111. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006) (applying only to federal agency 
actions). 
 112. There is some risk that critical habitat designations could also spur 
landowners to alter their land and make sure that species do not take up 
residence there. See generally Jonathan Adler, Money or Nothing: The Adverse 
Environmental Consequences of Uncompensated Land Use Controls, 49 B.C. L. 
REV. 301, 303–04 (2008). That risk would seem particularly acute where the 
habitat alteration requires no federal funding or authorization because section 
7’s prohibition on adverse modification then would not apply. However, there is 
also evidence that even private landowners will try to avoid activities on land 
designated as critical habitat and that designations may spur local or private land 
conservation efforts. See Jeffrey E. Zabel & Robert W. Paterson, The Effects of 
Critical Habitat Designation on Housing Supply: An Analysis of California 
Housing Construction Activity, 46 J. REGIONAL SCI. 67, 90 (2006); Owen, supra 
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Conversely, in the absence of anticipatory designations, areas that 
might become suitable for future use by species may instead be 
more likely to be developed. By the time the Services realize that 
an expanded critical habitat designation would be appropriate, 
there may be no suitable places left to designate. 
B. Mitigation 
There are also obvious and understandable reasons for the 
Services’ reluctance to invoke the regulatory controls in sections 7 
and 9.113 In part, the challenges are scientific and legal. 
Demonstrating that the greenhouse gas emissions from a single 
federal project are solely responsible for jeopardizing a listed 
species—let alone causing take of individual animals—would be 
impossible because any individual project’s emissions will blend 
with those of millions of other human activities.114 Stating that an 
individual project is adversely modifying critical habitat should be 
easier because a new set of greenhouse gas emissions will clearly 
cause changes, and even if those changes are unquantifiable and 
highly incremental, they are adverse.115 But the Services’ standard 
practice is to treat small-habitat modifications as exempt from the 
adverse modification prohibition, and so long as that standard 
practice persists, almost any contribution to climate change is 
likely to escape coverage.116  
Those legal challenges are closely related to several practical 
obstacles. If the Services were to use section 7 in an attempt to 
mitigate the causes of sea-level rise, theoretically they could use a 
                                                                                                             
 
note 47, at 180–81. Which of these reactions predominates is an empirical 
question to which existing studies have not provided a thorough answer, and 
reactions may also evolve as land managers become more sophisticated in their 
understanding of critical habitat designations. 
 113. For detailed discussion of these challenges, see Ruhl, supra note 41, at 
39–49. 
 114. See Ruhl, supra note 41, at 46–47. The Services could reach jeopardy 
findings by reasoning that an individual project contributes to the cumulative 
impact of climate change, and that cumulative impact is jeopardizing a species’ 
likelihood of survival. That approach would be analogous to the approach 
required by the Council on Environmental Quality’s implementing regulations 
for the National Environmental Policy Act. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7) 
(2009). However, the Services generally have not adopted that approach. 
 115. See Owen, supra note 47, at 155–56 (explaining this argument); see also 
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994) 
(“Virtually every dictionary we are aware of says that ‘to modify’ means to 
change moderately or in minor fashion.”). 
 116. See id. at 168–70. 
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few different approaches. One would be to focus on a few major 
greenhouse gas-emitting federal projects and find that those 
projects are causing jeopardy, adverse modification, or take.117 If 
the Services do that, however, they would have to explain why 
those projects are subject to regulatory constraint while smaller 
projects are exempt.118 Because all greenhouse gas emissions 
contribute to the same overall problem, that distinction could be 
difficult to justify.119 Alternatively, the Services could attempt to 
regulate all federal greenhouse gas-emitting projects, but that 
would lead to an extraordinary increase in their already 
overwhelming workloads, to say nothing of the costs imposed on 
action agencies and other regulated entities.120 In theory, the 
Services might achieve some administrative efficiency by asking 
action agencies to include standard mitigation measures as part of 
their project descriptions.121 For example, they might ask action 
agencies or project proponents to purchase carbon offsets to 
compensate for project emissions, and then they might invoke 
those offsets as the basis for finding compliance with ESA section 
7’s jeopardy and adverse modification prohibitions.122 But that 
approach would also put the Services in a difficult position, for it 
would compel them to become the organizers and overseers of a 
                                                                                                             
 117. See Moritz et al., supra note 46, at 224 (“While some federal actions 
may not contribute appreciable amounts of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere, 
many clearly do so.”). 
 118. That challenge is not unique to ESA implementation. See, e.g., 
Madeline June Kass, A NEPA Climate Paradox: Taking Greenhouse Gases into 
Account in Threshold Significance Determinations, 42 IND. L. REV. 47, 62–63, 
67, 85 (2009) (discussing the challenges associated with deciding what level of 
GHG emissions counts as “significant”). 
 119. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2, 
5, 15–16 (S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ 
assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf (explaining that most greenhouse 
gases are long-lasting and well-mixed, which means that emissions from all over 
the world contribute to the aggregate global problem). 
 120. See Owen, supra note 47, at 190 (quoting a service biologist who said 
agency staff were “barely keeping our heads above water” with their existing 
workload).  
 121. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(e)(1) (2006) (establishing ratios for ozone 
emission offsets). 
 122. For this approach to be legally viable, the Services would need to 
consider the offset to be part of the “action” under consultation. The approach 
might also be limited by laws and regulations constraining the spending 
practices of action agencies, which might not be able to contribute to offset 
programs without additional legal authorization. Nevertheless, even if the 
approach seems legally conceivable, at least for some activities potentially 
subject to section 7, the practical and political impediments would be 
substantial. 
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massive carbon offsets market. That task is much closer to the 
traditional competence of EPA, which has years of experience 
regulating air quality, than of agencies traditionally tasked with 
protecting wildlife.123 
And, of course, looming behind all of these legal and practical 
difficulties are the politics. The challenges of environmental 
regulation, though never small, have grown more intense in the 
current political climate. EPA’s incremental efforts to respond to 
climate change illustrate those challenges, for they have turned the 
agency into a constant target of political vitriol.124 The venom that 
the Services would face if they turned the ESA—a political 
lightning rod even before climate change emerged as an issue—
into the cutting edge of climate change regulation would likely be 
even worse. That reaction might well lead to funding limitations 
that undermine the Services’ work or even to statutory 
amendments undercutting or entirely removing their authority.125 
Even if that backlash does not occur, the best results that the 
Services could hope for would be to constrain a subset of the 
United States’ future emissions, which in turn represent just a 
fraction of the emissions contributing to the global problem, and to 
provide a model regulatory program capable of being imitated 
elsewhere.126 Such “whittl[ing] away” may be the only realistic 
way to address climate change, but the Services’ reluctance to 
wade into a firestorm, all in pursuit of a partial solution, is 
certainly still understandable.127 
                                                                                                             
 123. Even for EPA, which has experience administering air pollutant-
emissions trading systems, administering a major carbon offset program would 
likely be a challenging task. See Lesley K. McAllister, The Enforcement 
Challenge of Cap-and-Trade Regulation, 40 ENVTL. L. 1195, 1196–1202 (2010) 
(describing some of the challenges of overseeing carbon emissions trading 
programs). 
 124. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Bashing E.P.A. Is New Theme in G.O.P. 
Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/08/18/us/politics/18epa.html. The rhetoric is not limited to the political 
branches. See, e.g., Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 
1039–41 (9th Cir. 2012) (Smith, J. dissenting) (blasting a series of allegedly 
“extreme environmental decisions” issued by the Ninth Circuit). 
 125. See Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental 
Policy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1611, 1628, 1630 (2008) (describing political 
controversies that led to Congressional budgetary restrictions on ESA 
implementation). 
 126. See Global Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa. 
gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2012) 
(showing the United States’ share of global emissions). 
 127. See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007) (“Agencies, like 
legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory 
swoop. They instead whittle away at them over time . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
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C. Adaptation 
None of my observations about the challenges of using the 
ESA to mitigate sea-level rise is particularly new. The common 
response has been to argue that the Services should focus their 
efforts on climate adaptation, where the ESA arguably has more 
potential to do good.128 That argument is sensible, but the Services’ 
record suggests that promoting sea-level rise adaptation is also a 
difficult thing to do.129  
In part, the challenge arises from the inherent difficulties with 
regulating activities in the coastal zone, where land is widely 
coveted and development pressures tend to be intense.130 But the 
challenge also arises from the Services’ understandable desire to 
decouple climate change mitigation and adaptation. That 
decoupling creates an obvious fairness problem any time the 
Services seek to ratchet up controls on other activities in the 
coastal zone. So long as that regulation occurs without any 
corresponding attempt to control emissions, the affected agencies 
or landowners (or local governments that are encouraged to 
intensify their land use controls) quite reasonably can ask, “Why 
us? How can you increase our burden while you’re letting the real 
cause of the problem off scot-free?” “Because you’re the more 
accessible target” is not likely to be a satisfying answer. 
Because of these obstacles, we should not be surprised that the 
Services prefer to invoke their nonregulatory tools to respond to 
sea-level rise. But here, as well, the absence of a regulatory 
program—and, particularly, the absence of a regulatory program 
focused on climate change mitigation—creates another challenge, 
since it cuts off a potentially valuable source of funding. Protecting 
biodiversity usually means protecting or restoring habitat, and 
protecting or restoring habitat usually costs money. That money 
typically comes from one of three sources.131 The first is taxpayer 
dollars, and while public money protects thousands of acres every 
                                                                                                             
 128. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 41, at 59–60. 
 129. See supra notes 83–102 and accompanying text. 
 130. See generally Blake Hudson, Coastal Land Loss and the Mitigation–
Adaptation Dilemma: Between Scylla and Charybdis, 73 LA. L. REV. 31 (2012) 
(documenting intense development pressure in many coastal areas); Carol M. 
Rose, The Story of Lucas: Environmental Land Use Regulation Between 
Developers and the Deep Blue Sea, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 237, 
242–45 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005) (discussing the 
history of increasing demands upon coastal areas). 
 131. Of course, monitoring habitat or species conditions, engaging in 
planning processes, building simulation models, and conducting scientific 
research are all key components of the Services’ proposed strategies for 
adapting to sea-level rise, and they all require money as well. 
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year, no public resource is unlimited.132 The second is private 
fundraising, and that asset, though important, cannot protect 
enough habitat to sustain most species, particularly if those species 
depend upon expensive coastal real estate.133 Voluntary purchases 
are therefore likely to be important—perhaps necessary—
components of protective strategies, but they are by no means 
sufficient. Consequently, in many areas of environmental and land 
use regulation, a third funding source has become increasingly 
important. That source is mitigation funding, which regulators 
exact from permit applicants as compensation for the 
environmental impacts that those applicants’ proposed activities 
will create.134  
Unfortunately, mitigation funding currently holds little promise 
for addressing the biodiversity impacts of sea-level rise. For 
mitigation funding to be a viable approach, several conditions must 
exist. First, a regulated actor must be in the process of applying for 
a permit or some other sort of discretionary approval. Without such 
an application, regulators will have no opportunity to exact funding 
in exchange for permits. With sea-level rise, that condition often 
will be absent, at least in the immediate geographic areas where 
species are at risk.135 In some of those areas, there may be few 
proposals for additional development—the threat to species will 
derive from the combination of sea-level rise and existing 
development patterns—and the absence of discretionary approvals 
will deprive regulators of any opportunity to exact funding. Even 
                                                                                                             
 132. See Rob Hotokainen, President Meets Resistance on Federal 
Conservation Fund, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2011, at A19 (describing historic 
underfunding of the Land and Water Conservation Fund and resistance to 
funding increases). 
 133. See Paul Voosen, Myth-Busting Scientist Pushes Greens Past Reliance 
on ‘Horror Stories’, GREENWIRE (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/public/ 
Greenwire/2012/04/03/1 (describing the realization by The Nature Conservancy, 
the largest conservation purchase group in the world, that a purely purchase-
based strategy would not be sufficient to preserve biodiversity). See generally 
John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying Land Owners to Protect the 
Environment, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 4–5 (2005) (discussing the 
appeal and the limitations of this approach). 
 134. See generally Jessica B. Wilkinson & Robert Bendick, The Next 
Generation of Mitigation: Advancing Conservation Through Landscape-Level 
Mitigation Planning, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10023 (2010). 
 135. ESA section 7’s consultation requirement applies only to discretionary 
actions requiring federal authorization or funding. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) 
(2006); 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2009) (“Section 7 and the requirements of this part 
apply to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or 
control.”). Where development has already occurred, that discretionary action is 
absent, and even where new development is proposed, federal permits are often 
unnecessary.  
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where development is happening, it may not require federal 
permits and therefore may not trigger the oversight of agencies 
focused on biodiversity protection. Absent the need for a wetlands 
permit or federal highway funding, most development projects are 
subject only to state or local discretionary review.136 
Second, mitigation funding approaches succeed best when the 
project’s sponsor has some sort of appreciating asset—when land 
is about to become a housing development, for example—and the 
sponsor can treat the reduction in profits as a cost of doing 
business.137 In many areas threatened by sea-level rise, the 
opposite circumstance exists. Land values are eventually likely to 
decline, not appreciate, because flooded land is usually worth 
less.138 Consequently, regulators seeking funding for species 
protection would be imposing additional losses, not extracting 
value from appreciating assets. That is an awfully difficult, and 
potentially a rather inequitable, thing to do. 
Despite those limitations, a regulatory approach partly 
premised on mitigation funding could still work, at least in theory. 
There are activities that contribute to sea-level rise, are subject to 
discretionary federal oversight, and generate a lot of money. New 
oil leases and new power plants, for example, often require federal 
approvals, generate significant greenhouse gas emissions, and 
produce big profits.139 Therefore, these activities could be sources 
for mitigation funding. But the Services say they will never 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from those activities.140 Again, 
their reluctance is understandable; it may even represent a canny 
judgment that they can come closest to fulfilling their protective 
                                                                                                             
 136. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (emphasizing “the States’ traditional and 
primary power over land and water use”). 
 137. See Wilkinson & Bendick, supra note 134, at 10024 (noting the 
willingness of developers to treat mitigation payments “as a cost of doing 
business”); DANIEL S. KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 269–321 (2011) 
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 138. See THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, supra note 36, at 1 (projecting 
approximately $1.6 billion of lost property value on Big Pine Key under a worst-
case sea-level rise scenario). 
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OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE 
OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 55–85 (2011) (describing federal regulatory oversight 
over oil exploration); Clifford Kraus, Higher Prices Buoy Profits as Oil 
Companies Scramble for New Fields, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2011, at B3, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/business/global/exxon-and-
shell-earnings.html. 
 140. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
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mission by saving their limited political capital for other fights. 
But even if it reflects a certain harsh realism, that judgment still 
forecloses access to one of the few funding sources large enough 
turn the Services’ nonregulatory agenda from an appealing 
aspiration into a practical reality. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As I wrote this Essay, the North Carolina Legislature was 
considering a bill that would have mandated ignorance of the 
science of sea-level rise.141 The legislation, which passed the state 
senate before it was rejected its house of representatives, would 
have precluded government agencies from acknowledging the 
near-unanimous scientific predictions that sea-level rise will 
accelerate and, instead, would have required them to assume a 
continuation of historic trends.142 The proposal inspired its fair 
share of comedic ridicule, but it illustrates the serious dilemma in 
which the Services—and, indeed, any agency charged with 
addressing the impacts of sea-level rise or of climate change more 
generally—find themselves.143 They know the extent of the 
problem they face, and they have, on paper, the tools to respond. 
But environmental law in practice is often quite different from 
environmental law on the books, and the political climate in which 
government agencies operate plays a huge role in defining the 
discrepancies.144 At present, that political climate is incredibly 
hostile to regulatory responses to environmental problems. 
Sometimes it is hostile to any acknowledgement that those 
problems even exist. 
So what, then, are the Services to do? At a minimum, they 
should continue their present initiatives. Educating the public 
                                                                                                             
 141. John Murawski, Senate Approves Law that Challenges Sea Level 
Science: Lawmaker Calls Climate Change Forecasts Unreliable, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, June 13, 2012, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/06/13/ 
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 142. See id.; Leigh Phillips, Sea Versus Senators, 486 NATURE 450 (2012), 
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the bill, as well as the Atlantic Ocean’s refusal to accommodate the North Carolina 
Senate). 
 143. See, e.g., The Colbert Report: The Word: Sink or Swim (Comedy 
Central television broadcast June 4, 2012), available at http://www. 
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 144. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: 
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ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1999) (discussing pervasive gaps between statutory 
mandates and actual practices). 
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about the threats posed by sea-level rise is clearly important. That 
education can help correct common misconceptions about climate 
change, and it also can connect the problem, which to many people 
seems distant and abstract, with impacts and changes close to 
home.145 Similarly, developing simulation models and 
informational resources can be a valuable service to private land 
managers and can also help local governments as they engage in 
land-use planning and make decisions about specific development 
proposals.146 Even those modest initiatives will not be free of 
controversy; as North Carolina’s legislative initiative shows, even 
providing information can be perceived as a threatening act.147 
Nevertheless, those modest actions are likely to be less 
controversial than more traditional regulatory responses, and they 
also can help lay foundations for more robust responses, if and 
when those responses occur. 
Similarly, the Services could make several modest adjustments 
to the regulatory programs that they are already implementing. The 
Services should be anticipating sea-level rise in more of their 
critical habitat designations, even if they cannot anticipate with 
perfect accuracy where ideal habitat will emerge. The Services 
should likewise increase their efforts to use the section 7 process to 
protect species from other contributing threats.148 Neither of these 
shifts will be easy to achieve, but the alternative—leaving 
potentially important habitat undesignated and other stresses only 
lightly checked, at least until species’ circumstances leave no other 
option—is even worse. It would merely postpone the inevitable 
conflicts until the impacted species’ desperate circumstances 
remove almost all flexibility to craft a creative response.149 The 
                                                                                                             
 145. Of course, ample research has demonstrated that providing additional 
information about climate change does not always influence people’s views 
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al., The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived 
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Law, 2013 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
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Services should also provide formalized, written guidance on 
designating critical habitat and on implementing section 7 in the 
face of climate change.150 Designating critical habitat and 
negotiating project adjustments and changes are not easy things to 
do; action agencies and project proponents are generally interested 
in minimizing expenses and time commitments, not protecting 
species. Guidance on accounting for climate change during ESA 
implementation processes could provide staff-level regulators with 
some valuable backing.151 The Services’ present documents, which 
evince a commitment to everything but traditional regulation, do 
exactly the opposite.152  
In combination, a mix of slight adjustments to existing 
regulatory programs and an aggressive education, research, and 
outreach effort might actually do quite a lot to protect some 
species. Not all states, municipalities, or even private landowners 
are in a rush to convert habitats, particularly in the present real 
estate market, and information that can inform local environmental 
protection strategies will sometimes be put to use. Indeed, state and 
local governments have public safety reasons for wanting to keep 
human uses out of areas likely to be altered by sea-level rise, for 
those areas, almost by definition, are dangerous places to build.153 
By combining those incentives with the natural aversion of most 
landowners to legal risk, the Services might actually be able to 
protect some significant areas of coastal habitat. If they can work 
collaboratively with other federal programs that affect 
development in coastal areas, like the National Flood Insurance 
Program, the potential for protection may be even greater.154 
Nevertheless, in many areas, this combination of approaches 
will almost certainly be insufficient. No amount of education or 
                                                                                                             
 150. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting the absence of any 
guidance on using section 7 to address climate change adaptation). 
 151. For a discussion of the dynamics of these negotiations, see Owen, supra 
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 152. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
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Management: The US Experience, 3 ENVTL. HAZARDS 111 (2001). A few 
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(W.D. Wash. 2004) (requiring consultation). 
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outreach will save the threatened species of the Florida Keys if sea 
levels continue to rise.155 Neither will there ever be enough money 
available to simply place coastal habitats in preservation status. In 
some areas, the only way to stop sea-level rise from exterminating 
species will be to first slow and then, eventually, to stop sea-level 
rise. And unless some geoengineering scheme emerges as the 
white knight riding to our rescue, that means limiting greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
Consequently, this Essay ends with a rather unoriginal 
suggestion. The most promising legal fix for sea-level rise, as for 
most of the environmental problems arising from climate change, 
lies in a combination of domestic legislation that drastically 
reduces greenhouse gas emissions and international agreements 
that commit other countries to do the same. At present, that 
combination of legislation and international agreements may seem 
unattainable. To many opponents of environmental regulation, it 
also seems rather undesirable. And even if effective treaties and 
legislation were suddenly in place, existing emissions will continue 
to raise sea levels for years to come; the changes would simply be 
smaller.156 But without those legal changes, the challenges of 
rising seas will be too much for many of our coastal species to 
survive.  
  
                                                                                                             
 155. See Maschinski et al., supra note 12 (evaluating threats to species in the 
Florida Keys); THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, supra note 36 (mapping scenarios 
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 156. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 23, 
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